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the negotiations can come to a complete gridlock: Players never reach
an agreement. Gridlock can occur between players with arbitrarily sim
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gress has failed to act on these issues. The economic literature has pro-
posed several explanations for the inability of legislators to reach seem-
ingly beneﬁcial agreements such as electoral calculus, vested interests,
or uncertainty over the distributional impact of reforms (Drazen 2002).
This paper shows that gridlock and legislative inertia can be the strategic
consequence of two features of policy making. First, the policies that gov-
ern entitlements, immigration, or taxation are typically continuing in na-
ture, remaining in effect until a new agreement is reached. Second, a con-
stantly evolving environment requires these policies to be periodically
revisited.
To understand how the combination of the continuing nature of pol-
icies and an evolving environment leads to excessive disagreement, con-
sider the case of legislators negotiating over taxation. When the budget
surplus is large or the returns to public spending are low, lower tax rates
may be favored by all parties to ease the tax burden of the citizens. When
deﬁcits run high or the returns to public spending are high, all parties
may agree to generate extra tax revenues to reduce the public debt or ﬁ-
nance socially desirable programs. In other times, however, legislatorsmay
genuinely disagree on whether taxes should be raised or cut. If today’s
policy becomes the default for future negotiations, liberals may be reluc-
tant to decrease taxes when that is desirable, out of fear that their conser-
vative counterparts will veto tax increases when the need for high taxes
arises. Similarly, anticipating future disagreement, conservatives may re-
fuse to increase taxes when needed, out of fear that liberals will oppose
tax cuts in the future.
We ﬁrst formalize this insight in a model in which two players engage
in an inﬁnite sequence of choices over two alternatives, called L and R .
At the beginning of each period, one alternative serves as the status quo.
If both players agree to move away from the status quo, the new agree-
ment is implemented. Otherwise, the status quo stays in place. In both
cases, the implemented alternative determines the players’ payoffs in the
present period and becomes the status quo for the next; that is, players
operate under the endogenous status quo protocol. We assume that players’
preferences over the alternatives change over time. They sometimes dis-
agree, and whenever they do, one player (the rightist) prefers R and the
other (the leftist) prefers L.
We show that in all stationary equilibria, the leftist player votes for L
and the rightist player votes for Rmore often than they would if the pol-
icies were not continuing in nature or if there were no shocks to the pref-
erences. Thus, the endogenous status quo exacerbates players’ ideolog-
ical polarization. As a result, they may fail to reach an agreement evenfrom the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain), grants ECO 2013 42710 P, MDM
2014 0431, and Comunidad de Madrid, MadEco CM (S2015/HUM 3444).
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when the status quo is Pareto dominated. The status quo stays in place
too often, and the bargaining outcome is insufﬁciently responsive to the
environment.
Our analysis reveals that players’ equilibrium behavior is driven by a vi-
cious cycle: players that behave in a polarized way disagree more often;
more frequent disagreement in turn increases players’ incentives to secure
their preferred status quo and thus increases their incentives to become
even more polarized. Because of this vicious cycle, the polarizing effect
of the endogenous status quo can be quite dramatic. We identify a class
of payoff proﬁles such that for any proﬁle in that class, if players are sufﬁ-
ciently patient, then the negotiations can come to a complete gridlock in
which players never reach an agreement, and the bargaining outcome is
unresponsive to the evolution of preferences. Interestingly, this class of
payoff proﬁles allows players’ preferences to be arbitrarily similar.
When players bargain over more than two alternatives, the polarizing
effect of the endogenous status quo can be accompanied by other equi-
librium effects. These effects depend on the ﬁne details of the model
such as the process that governs the evolution of the state or the bargain-
ing procedure used to select the outcome in each period (with more
than two alternatives, not all bargaining procedures are equivalent). The
complex interaction of these effects makes it hard to isolate analytically
the impact of the endogenous status quo on the equilibrium behavior.
However, we identify two arguably relevant environments in which our
results are qualitatively unchanged irrespective of the number of alterna-
tives. In Section IV.B, we analyze a setting in which in each period, play-
ers use a bargaining procedure that favors incremental policy changes.
Such a procedure captures the incremental nature of legislative policy
making (Hayes 1992; Wildavsky 1992) and has been shown to generate
predictions consistent with the actual decisions of monetary policy com-
mittees (Riboni and Ruge-Murcia 2010). We show that under this proce-
dure, the endogenous status quo generates polarization and status quo
inertia as in the case of two alternatives. Moreover, in certain environ-
ments, the magnitude of these effects is independent of the space of al-
ternatives. In Section IV.C, we allow for a large class of within-period bar-
gaining procedures, but in contrast to the two-alternative model in which
players bargain once every period, we assume that preferences change
smoothly and players can revise the status quo as soon as the environ-
ment renders it inadequate. This assumption is meant to reﬂect the fact
that actual bargaining institutions typically allow the bargaining parties
to propose policy changes whenever the situation prompts it. We show
that in such an environment, the equilibrium outcome exhibits status
quo inertia.
Our model is institutionally sparse but can shed light on some aspects
of policy making in the US Congress. It predicts that in policy areas gov-3
erned by permanent legislations and subject to changing needs—such as
mandatory spending, taxation, or civil liberties and national security—leg-
islators’ voting behavior can exhibit an excessive degree of polarization
that can lead to inefﬁcient policy inertia. Clearly, our model cannot claim
to explain all gridlock in Congress nor the dramatic increase in polariza-
tion that has been happening over the last decades. It does, however, sug-
gest that the degree of polarization in legislators’ voting record may over-
estimate their actual degree of ideological polarization. We discuss this
issue in more detail in Section V.
Our results also have implications for other institutional settings. In
some countries, monetary policy is set by a committee with heteroge-
neous preferences and beliefs, and the interest rate stays the same until
the committee agrees to change it (see Riboni and Ruge-Murcia 2008).
Our results show that the endogeneity of the status quo can affect the
ability of the committee to respond to economic shocks. Similarly, the
renegotiations of ongoing contracts such as trade agreements, interna-
tional treaties (e.g., for the World Trade Organization or the European
Union), and ﬁnancial or labor contracts are usually conducted in the
presence of a binding previous agreement. The impossibility of making
these contracts fully contingent on all economic shocks and political
events creates the need for frequent renegotiation, making the forces
we have highlighted relevant in these settings.II. Related Literature
A. Inefﬁciency and Inertia in Dynamic
Policy Making ModelsPolicy makers’ incentives (not) to adopt socially beneﬁcial policy changes
have been the study of numerous papers. Inefﬁcient status quo inertia
can arise if there is uncertainty over who beneﬁts from the policy change
(Fernandez and Rodrik 1991; Strulovici 2010), if the costs of policy
change are borne disproportionately by those who initiate these changes
(Alesina and Drazen 1991), or if citizens respond to the current policy by
undertaking private actions that make them more likely to oppose a pol-
icy change in the future (Glomm and Ravikumar 1995; Krusell and Rios-
Rull 1996; Coate and Morris 1999). In our model, it is neither the uncer-
tainty over future preferences nor their dependence on past policies that
matters, but the mere fact that they evolve.11 Inefﬁciencies can also arise if the allocation of decision power evolves over time (Pers
son and Svensson 1989; Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Krusell and Rios Rull 1999; Battaglini
and Coate 2007, 2008; Azzimonti 2011) or if it depends on past decisions (Besley and Coate
1998; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin 2008, 2012, 2015; Bai
and Lagunoff 2011; Baron, Diermeier, and Fong 2012; Cho 2012; Duggan and Forand 2013).
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B. Bargaining with an Endogenous Status Quo
in a Static EnvironmentOur paper complements the literature on dynamic bargaining with an en-
dogenous status quo. Most of this literature considers environments in
which preferences are static; the bargaining outcome changes over time
because the identity of the proposer changes or because the same proposer
seeks the support of a different coalition. In our basic model with two al-
ternatives and unanimity rule, these two channels do not play any role. In-
stead, the impetus for policy change comes solely from the evolution of
preferences. In static environments with collective goods policies, this lit-
erature (Baron 1996; Baron andHerron 2003; Zapal 2011b) ﬁnds that the
endogenous status quo has amoderating effect. In contrast, we show that in
a changing environment, the endogenous status quo has a polarizing effect.
The moderating effect highlighted by the aforementioned literature
is similar to the effect that occurs in this model in the case of more than
two alternatives (see Sec. IV.A). This effect is closely related to the obser-
vation initially made by Romer and Rosenthal (1978) that an extreme
status quo increases the leverage of the proposer and is thus detrimental
to nonproposers. Therefore, with an endogenous status quo, implement-
ing a moderate policy today can constrain the next proposer. Diermeier
and Fong (2011) show that this effect can limit the bargaining power of a
monopolistic proposer, and Bowen, Chen, and Eraslan (2014) show that it
mitigates the inefﬁciency due to political uncertainty. We contribute to that
literature by showing that in a stochastic environment, under reasonable
conditions, the moderating effect is dominated by the polarizing effect.
Since Kalandrakis (2004), a large literature has looked at the case of
purely distributive policies.2 These papers focus on the fairness of equi-
librium allocations and on the size and stability of the coalitions that sup-
port them. By virtue of analyzing collective goods policies under the una-
nimity rule, our paper has nothing to say on these issues. Instead, we focus
on the responsiveness of policies to the environment and on polarization,
on which the aforementioned papers are mute, as in the distributive set-
ting, players’ preferences are constant and always diametrically opposed.C. Bargaining with an Endogenous Status Quo
in an Evolving EnvironmentEven though dynamic bargaining with an endogenous status quo in a sto-
chastic environment is at the center of many economically relevant situa-2 See, among others, Bernheim, Rangel, and Rayo (2006), Anesi (2010), Kalandrakis
(2010), Diermeier and Fong (2011), Anesi and Seidmann (2015), Bowen and Zahran
(2012), Baron and Bowen (2013), and Richter (2014).
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tions, theexisting literatureon this topic is scarce. To thebest ofourknowl-
edge, only Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2008), Zapal (2011a), Duggan and
Kalandrakis (2012), and Bowen, Chen, Eraslan, and Zapal (2014) make
progress on this front. Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2008) solve a two-period,
two-state example with quadratic preferences and use numerical solutions
for a six-state, inﬁnite-horizon model. Zapal (2011a) considers a two-state
environment with quadratic preferences and a continuum of alternatives.
These authors recognize that the dynamic linkage may lead to inefﬁcient
policies. However, they do not identify the systematic polarizing effect of
the endogenous status quo. Adding noise to the status quo, Duggan and
Kalandrakis (2012) establish the existence of an equilibrium in a very gen-
eral setting. Bowen et al. (2014) show that the inefﬁciencies generated by
the endogenous status can be eliminated if the status quo can be fully con-
tingent on the state of nature.
Our paper differs from these contributions in that by focusing on two
alternatives, we show that the polarizing and inertial effects arise in every
equilibrium for a large class of environments, and we characterize the de-
terminants of their magnitude. We also investigate the conditions under
which these effects are robust to allowing for more alternatives.
Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010) analyze a game similar to our N-
alternative model under four different within-period bargaining pro-
cedures. For tractability, they assume myopic players, which severs the
strategic link present in ourmodel. Onewithin-period bargaining proce-
dure—the consensus procedure—is shown to lead to least frequent and
mostmoderate policy changes. Using data fromﬁve central banks, Riboni
and Ruge-Murcia ﬁnd that all procedures, including the consensus proce-
dure, underestimate the actual degree of status quo inertia. Consistently
with this ﬁnding, in Section IV.B, we consider the consensus procedure
and show that with forward-looking players, the endogenous status quo
can dramatically increase status quo inertia.III. The Two-Alternative Model
A. The ModelTwo players, l and r, are in a relationship that lasts for inﬁnitely many
periods. There are two alternatives, X 5 {L, R }. In each period t, a status
quo qðtÞ∈fL;Rg is in place, and players vote simultaneously on which al-
ternative to adopt. If both players vote for the same alternative, this alter-
native is implemented. If they disagree, this period’s status quo q(t) is im-
plemented.The implemented alternative x(t), be it thenewagreement or
the status quo, determines the players’ payoff in t and becomes the status
quo for the next period t 1 1.6
The payoff of player k ∈ {l, r } in period t from alternative x ∈ X is de-
noted by U kðvðtÞ; xÞ; where v(t) denotes the state of nature in that pe-
riod. To capture the dynamic nature of the environment, we assume that
fvðtÞ : t ≥ 0g is a stationary Markov process on an arbitrary (ﬁnite or in-
ﬁnite) state space Θ with sigma algebra S. That is, the state v(t) depends
on the past only through last period’s state v(t 1), and the distribution
of v(t) conditional on v(t 1) is independent of t. Note that this assump-
tion does not rule out deterministic processes. Throughout, v denotes an
arbitrary realization of v(t), and Pv denotes the probability distribution of
v(t 1 1) conditional on v(t) 5 v. The state v(t) is observed in t by both
players before they cast their votes. We assume that for all x ∈ X, v→
U kðv; xÞ is bounded and measurable with respect to S: Players maximize
the expected discounted sum of payoffs, and d ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor.
In this game, denoted by Gen, the strategic link across periods comes
solely from the continuing nature of the policies. To characterize the im-
pact of the endogenous status quo on the equilibrium behavior and out-
comes, we will compare Gen to the game Gex, which differs from Gen only
in that in every period t, the status quo is exogenously ﬁxed at some
qðtÞ ∈ X , irrespective of players’ past actions.
As is customary in dynamic voting games with an inﬁnite horizon, we
look for Markov perfect equilibria in stage-undominated strategies as de-
ﬁned in Baron and Kalai (1993).3 A Markov strategy for player k in Gex or
Gen, denoted by jk, maps in each period t the current state v(t) and status
quo q(t) into a probability distribution over votes. Stage undomination
amounts to assuming that in each period, each player votes for the alter-
native that gives her the greater continuation payoff. It rules out patho-
logical equilibria such as both players always voting for the status quo.
Throughout the paper, the term equilibrium refers to this equilibrium
concept unless stated otherwise. We derive all our results without placing
any restrictions on how players vote when indifferent. However, when ex-
plaining the intuition in the text, we adopt the convention that they vote
for R.3 Stage undominated Markov perfect equilibria, or variants thereof, are used in almost
all the inﬁnite horizon models cited in this paper. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) show that
requiring only subgame perfection leads to a folk theorem. As shown in Baron and Kalai
(1993), stage undominated Markov perfect equilibria have a focal point property that de
rives from their simplicity. Markov perfection in the legislative sphere can be justiﬁed on
the grounds that the game is played by a sequence of legislators who are never certain to be
reelected. In such cases, the institutional memory required for more sophisticated nonsta
tionary equilibria involving inﬁnitely nested punishment strategies may be inappropriate.
See Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2013) for a formalization of this argument and Krehbiel
(1991) for a critical discussion of the prevalence of folk theorem like cooperation among
legislators.
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B. Additional Assumptions and NotationDeﬁnition 1. A payoff function U : Θ X→ℝ is more leftist than
another payoff function U 0 (or, equivalently, U 0 is more rightist than U )
if for all v ∈ Θ,
U ðv;RÞ U ðv;LÞ ≤ U 0ðv;RÞ U 0ðv;LÞ:
Throughout, we assume that Ur is more rightist than Ul, and we occa-
sionally refer toplayers r and l as the rightist and the leftist players, respec-
tively. This assumption has a natural interpretation in political economy
applications: players can be unambiguously ranked on the ideological
spectrum. Note, however, that it imposes no restrictions on the prefer-
ence distribution of a single player nor on the severity of the conﬂict of
interest between players: both players might prefer the same alternative
for an arbitrarily large subset of Θ.
For all v ∈ Θ, let U kðvÞ≗U kðv;RÞ U kðv;LÞ be the relative period pay-
off for player k from alternative R as compared to L in a period in which
the state is v. We call Uk(v) player k’s current preference, as the sign of Uk(v)
determines her preference for the current period without taking into ac-
count the consequences of today’s bargaining outcome on future peri-
ods. Throughout the paper, for any pair of functions or scalars fl, fr, we
denote f 5 ð fl ; frÞ: For example, we denote U 5 ðU l ;U rÞ:
To illustrate our results, sometimes we will use the following family of
payoff proﬁles in which each player k has single-peaked preferences with
a peak equal to the state v plus a player-speciﬁc shift bk. This shift can be
interpreted as her ideological bias.
Deﬁnition 2. WhenΘ ⊆ℝ and X ⊂ℝ, a proﬁle of payoff functions U
is quadratic if for all k ∈ {l, r }, v ∈Θ, and x ∈ X, U kðv; xÞ 5 ½x ðv1 bkÞ2
for some bl, br ∈ ℝ such that bl < br .
A few comments about the model are in order. First, we assume that in
each period the outcome is decided by a simultaneous vote, but with two
alternatives and two players, most within-period bargaining procedures
are equivalent.4
Second, to assess the role of the endogenous status quo, we compare
Gen to the game with the exogenous status quo protocol Gex. The exoge-
nous status quo protocol is the simplest dynamic bargaining protocol
that severs the link between today’s agreement and tomorrow’s status
quo. Hence, this benchmark protocol allows us to show in a transparent
way that it is the continuing nature of policies that leads to polarization.
Finally, in this model, today’s bargaining outcome affects the future
only via tomorrow’s status quo. In a more general model, it could also af-4 For instance, using standard equilibrium concepts, equilibrium outcomes are the same
when players vote simultaneously or sequentially, when they make take it or leave it offers,
or when they make several alternating offers in each bargaining period.
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fect tomorrow’s states of nature. We abstract from this dependence to
isolate the dynamic linkage of the endogenous status quo in a transpar-
ent way.C. Equilibrium AnalysisAs a benchmark, we ﬁrst look at the game with an exogenous status quo
Gex. Consider player k in period t. Since the bargaining outcome imple-
mented in t has no impact on the subgame starting in the next period t1
1, player k votes for R if and only if
U kðvðtÞÞ ≥ 0: ð1Þ
Hence, Gex has a unique equilibrium in which players simply vote for the
best alternative according to their current preferences.
Consider now the same situation in the game with an endogenous sta-
tus quo Gen. The alternative x implemented in t affects player k’s payoff
in t, and since x becomes the status quo in t 1 1, it also affects the sub-
game that starts in t 1 1. Let W jkðv; xÞ be the expected value of that con-
tinuation game, conditional on v(t) 5 v and on the strategy proﬁle j be-
ing played after t. Let W jkðvÞ ≗W jkðv;RÞ W jkðv;LÞ. One can interpret
W jk as the relative expected gain for player k from having R instead of
L as the next period’s status quo. With a slight abuse of notation, we call
W jk the continuation value of player k.
Stage undomination requires that in each period, players vote as if
they were pivotal. Hence, in Gen, player k votes for R in t if and only if
U kðvðtÞÞ1 dW jkðvðtÞÞ ≥ 0: ð2Þ
Comparing (1) and (2), one can see that the effect of the endogenous sta-
tus quo on equilibrium behavior is completely captured byW jk : IfW
j
kðvÞ is
positive (negative) for all v ∈Θ, then inGen, player k votes forR in a larger
(smaller) set of states than in Gex.
The ﬁrst proposition characterizes the effect of the endogenous status
quo on equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium, for all v ∈ Θ, W jl ðvÞ ≤ 0 ≤ W jr ðvÞ:
Hence, in Gen, player l votes for L and player r votes for R for a larger set
of states (in the inclusion sense) than in Gex.
Proof. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The intuition for proposition 1 is as follows. The next period’s status
quo affects the next period’s bargaining outcome only if players disagree
in that period, in which case the status quo stays in place. Under our as-
sumption that Ur is more rightist than Ul, when players disagree, r prefers
R while l prefers L. Hence, player r prefers R as the future status quo
while player l prefers L as the future status quo, which explains W jl ðvÞ ≤9
0 ≤ W jr ðvÞ. Therefore, player l is willing to sacriﬁce some of her payoff in
the current period by distorting her voting behavior in favor of L in order
to secure L as the next period’s status quo. Similarly, player r is willing to
sacriﬁce some of her current payoff to secure R as the next period’s status
quo.
Since Ur is more rightist than Ul, from (1) we see that already under an
exogenous status quo, player r votes for R in a larger (in the inclusion
sense) set of states than player l. Hence, proposition 1 implies that the en-
dogenous status quo has a polarizing effect: it exacerbates the conﬂict of
interest between the leftist and rightist players. In what follows, we refer
to this equilibrium behavior as strategic polarization.
Since, under the endogenous status quo, player l votes for L and player
r votes for R for a larger set of states than under the exogenous status
quo, the endogenous status quo leads to more status quo inertia.
Corollary 1. In any equilibrium of Gen, the set of states in which the
status quo stays in place is greater in the inclusion sense than in the equi-
librium of G ex.
An important implication of corollary 1 is that the equilibrium out-
comes may be Pareto inefﬁcient even in the static sense. A sequence of
policies ðxðtÞÞt∈ℕ is statically efﬁcient if in each period t 0∈ℕ, there is no
other policy y that is strictly preferred by both players to x(t 0), keeping
the policies in the other periods unchanged. Under the endogenous sta-
tus quo, there may be states in which both players would beneﬁt from
changing the policy without changing the status quo for the next period;
but since no player can commit to such a temporary change, one player
prefers to stay at the current status quo.
It is instructive to note that the magnitude of the strategic polarization
identiﬁed in proposition 1 and corollary 1 is the result of a vicious cycle in
which players’ behaviors feed on themselves. To see this, observe that as
player l distorts her voting behavior in favor of L, players become less likely
to reach an agreement in each period. This increase in the probability of
future disagreement in turn makes player r more willing to defend her
preferred status quo R and thus makes her distort her behavior in favor
of R even further.
Because of this strategic complementarity, there can be multiple equi-
libria that differ in their degree of strategic polarization. Since a more
polarized behavior from a given player is detrimental to the other player,
these equilibria can be Pareto ranked. We will say that for any two strat-
egy proﬁles j and j 0, j 0 is more polarized than j if for all v ∈ Θ,W j 0l ðvÞ ≤
W jl ðvÞ ≤ 0 ≤ W jr ðvÞ ≤ W j
0
r ðvÞ:
Proposition 2. There exists a least (most) polarized equilibrium,
and this equilibrium is Pareto best (worst) among all equilibria.
We conclude this section with three comments. First, note that the only
assumption we impose on players’ payoff is that Ul is more leftist than Ur .10
Hence, the direction in which the endogenous status quo biases players’
behavior depends only on players’ relative ideological positions. A player
with a given Uk is biased in favor of L if she plays against a more rightist
opponent, but she becomes biased in favor of R if she plays against a more
leftist opponent. The intuition behind this result is that since the status
quomatters only when players disagree, players’ preferences over the next
status quo are given by their policy preferences conditional on disagree-
ment, which depend only on players’ relative ideology.
Second, we have established so far that if the endogenous status quo
protocol distorts players’ behavior relative to the exogenous status quo
protocol, then these distortions increase disagreement and create status
quo inertia. We have not established, however, that these distortions are
strict, that is, that the equilibrium of Gex is not an equilibrium of Gen. How-
ever, for the equilibriumofGex to be also an equilibriumofGen, the process
fvðtÞ : t ≥ 0gmust satisfy quite restrictive conditions. To see this, consider
a sequence of states in which both players’ current preferences favor R ,
but l ’s preferences for R are vanishingly weak. Then in Gex, both players
vote for R in all such stateswhile inGen, if theprobability that players’pref-
erences disagree in the next period is not vanishingly small in the limit, l
will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to vote for L instead of R . In Section III.E, we show
that this is thecase, forexample,whenpayoffsarequadratic (seedeﬁnition2)
and the state is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time.
Third, in this simple model, the inefﬁciency generated by the endoge-
nous status quo arises only if preferences evolve over time. To see this, ob-
serve that if players’ preferences were ﬁxed, then in Gen, each player would
vote according to her current preferences as in Gex. The status quo could
be replaced only in the ﬁrst period, and the constant bargaining outcome
would be trivially Pareto optimal. Hence, it is the combination of the en-
dogenous status quo and the evolving environment that generates polar-
ization and inefﬁcient status quo inertia.D. The Determinants of Strategic Polarization
and Gridlock EffectIn this section, we investigate the main drivers of strategic polarization. Since
strategic polarization is driven by the anticipation of future disagreement, it
should be affected by the degree of players’ conﬂict of interest and by their
patience. Players whose current preferences are more likely to disagree,
and who care more about the future, should be more willing to sacriﬁce
today’s payoff to obtain their preferred status quo for tomorrow’s negotia-
tions. The next proposition formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 3. Let (Ul, Ur) and ðU 0l ;U 0rÞ be two proﬁles of payoff
functions such that U 0l is more leftist than Ul and U
0
r is more rightist than
Ur (in the sense of deﬁnition 1), and let d and d0 be two discount factors11
such that d0 ≥ d. If j and j 0 denote the Pareto best (worst) equilibria for
the parameters Ul, Ur, and d and for U 0l ;U
0
r , and d
0, respectively, then j 0 is
more polarized than j.
Since strategic polarization leads to status quo inertia, proposition 3 im-
plies that more patient and more ideologically polarized players are less
likely to agree on Pareto-improving policies after a shock to the environ-
ment has made the status quo suboptimal.
Thenextproposition shows that the impactof theendogenous statusquo
on equilibrium behavior can be quite dramatic: under some conditions,
there exists a gridlock equilibrium in which players never reach an agree-
ment, and hence the bargaining outcome is totally unresponsive to the evo-
lution of the environment.
Proposition 4. Let jg be the strategy proﬁle in which player l always
votes for L and player r always votes for R. Then jg is an equilibrium if
and only if for any v ∈ Θ,
E vð0Þ v o
∞
t50
dtU lðvðtÞÞ
 
≤ 0 ≤ E vð0Þ v o
∞
t50
dtU r ðvðtÞÞ
 
: ð3Þ
Condition (3) requires that for any initial state, player r’s (l’s) expected
payoff from implementing R in all future periods is greater (smaller) than
her expected payoff from implementing L in all future periods.
Note that whenever jg is an equilibrium, it is necessarily most polarized,
and so from proposition 2, it is also Pareto worst. Hence, proposition 3
implies that if gridlock is an equilibrium for some environment, then it re-
mains an equilibrium when players become more patient or more ideo-
logically polarized. The following corollary, however, demonstrates that
the degree of ideological polarization needed for gridlock does not have
to be large.
Corollary 2. Suppose that the process fvðtÞ : t ≥ 0g is uniformly er-
godic and that
E ½U lð~vÞ < 0 < E ½U rð~vÞ; ð4Þ
where ~v is a random variable distributed according to the stationary dis-
tribution of fvðtÞ : t ≥ 0g:5 Then there exists d < 1 such that for all d ≥ d;
jg is an equilibrium.65 A stationary Markov chain with transition function f is uniformly ergodic if, as n→ ∞,
f n(m0) converges to its unique stationary distribution uniformly over all initial distributions
m0 (see Meyn and Tweedie 1993, chap. 16). This condition is satisﬁed, for instance, when
the Markov process is i.i.d. When Θ is ﬁnite, a (generic) sufﬁcient condition for uniform
ergodicity is that the transition matrix has all its entries strictly positive. Similar sufﬁ
cient conditions can be derived when Θ is compact (see, e.g., Meyn and Tweedie’s theo
rem 16.2.5).
6 Note that the order of the qualiﬁers matters. There may not exist d < 1 such that, for all
d ≥ d; gridlock is an equilibrium regardless of how close E ½U lðvÞ and E ½U r ðvÞ are to zero.
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Corollary 2 implies that as long as (4) is satisﬁed, even players with ar-
bitrarily similar preferences (i.e., jE ½U lð~vÞ E ½U rð~vÞj arbitrarily small)
may disagree forever if they are sufﬁciently patient. Note that condition
(4) requires that players’ payoffs are not identical, but it includes some
environments in which players’ current preferences always favor the same
alternative. For example, consider an i.i.d. process with two equally likely
states vR and vL such that U ðvRÞ 5 ð1; 2Þ and U ðvLÞ 5 ð 2; 1Þ: In this
environment, for both players, R is best in state vR and L is best in state
vL; but for d > ⅔, condition (3) is satisﬁed, so gridlock is an equilibrium.7
Clearly, in the last example, players always agreeing on the Pareto-
efﬁcient policy is an equilibrium as well. The next section, however, shows
an example of an environment in which gridlock is the unique equilib-
rium for sufﬁciently patient players.E. An Example with Quadratic Preferences
and I.I.D. ShocksIn this section, we illustrate our results in the following simple environ-
ment. The proﬁle of payoff functions U is quadratic (see deﬁnition 2),
R 5 1, L 5 1, and the state is drawn in an i.i.d. fashion across periods.
For the quadratic payoff speciﬁcation, the current preferences are given
by U kðvÞ 5 4ðv1 bkÞ: Substituting this expression in (1) and in (2), we
obtain that under an exogenous status quo, each player k votes for R if
and only if v ≥ bk, while under an endogenous status quo, player k votes
for R if and only if v ≥ bk dW kðvÞ=4: Since today’s state does not affect
future states, Wk(v) is independent of v. Therefore, in the equilibria of
Gex and Gen, each player k plays a cutoff strategy with the cutoff bk
and bk dW k=4; respectively.
Denote p
k
5 dW k=4: The above implies that in the game with an endog-
enous status quo, players behave as if the status quo were exogenous but
their ideological biases were b1 p instead of b. From proposition 1, in any
equilibrium of Gen, p
l
≤ 0 ≤ p
r
. Hence, since bl < br, the strategic polari-
zation as captured by p moves players farther apart on the ideological
spectrum.
It is instructive to see how Wk, and thus pk, are determined. Recall that
Wk measures the expected gain for player k in period t from having R in-
stead of L as the status quo in t 1 1. The status quo in t 1 1 matters only
if players’ votes disagree in that period, that is, when vðt 1 1Þ∈ ½ br
dW r=4; bl dW l=4Þ; in which case the status quo stays in place. For
any such v(t1 1), the continuation payoff from implementing R relative7 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this example to us.
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to L is U kðvðt 1 1ÞÞ1 dW k . Hence, in equilibrium, Wk must satisfy
W k 5 ∫
bl ðd=4ÞW l
br ðd=4ÞW r ½U kðvÞ1 dW kdPðvÞ:
Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium pr in the symmetric case in which br 5
bl 5 0:6 and v(t) is drawn uniformly onΘ5 [ 2, 2] (by symmetry, pl5
pr). For d < 0.7, the equilibrium is unique and the corresponding pr
strictly increases in d. When d ≥ 0.7, condition (3) is satisﬁed, so the grid-
lock equilibrium exists (which corresponds to pr 5 1.4). For d ∈ (0.7,
0.83), there are three equilibria, and for d ≥ 0.83, only the gridlock equi-
librium remains. In that case, under an exogenous status quo, players
reach an agreement with probability .7 (when br ≤ v < bl), but they
never do so under an endogenous status quo.IV. The N-Alternative ModelThe two-alternative model allows us to isolate in a transparent way the
polarizing effect of the endogenous status quo. In this section, we argue
that under reasonable conditions, this effect is robust to the number of
alternatives.A. Polarization and Moderation: IntuitionWith an arbitrary number of alternatives, it is still true that the status quo
matters only when players disagree, so players’ equilibrium behavior stillFIG. 1. Equilibrium pr as a function of d14
depends on which policies they prefer when they disagree. However, play-
ers’ preferences conditional on disagreement are harder to determine,
because there is more than one way to disagree. Moreover, the conse-
quences of some types of disagreement depend on the within-period bar-
gaining procedure (i.e., the procedure that is used to select the bargain-
ing outcome in each period).
First, as in the two-alternative model, players might disagree about
which policies are better than the status quo. For example, in the context
of legislative bargaining over tax policies, the conservativesmay want to de-
crease tax rates while the liberals may want to increase them. In such dis-
agreement states, the status quo stays in place irrespective of the within-
period bargaining procedure. Hence, a higher (lower) status quo results
in a higher (lower) tax rate. When the status quo is endogenous, the an-
ticipation of such disagreement biases the conservatives in favor of lower
and the liberals in favor of higher taxes. This is the same polarizing effect as
in the case of two alternatives.
However, players may also agree that a certain subset of policies is better
than the status quo but disagree about the ranking of these alternatives. In
such disagreements, the bargaining outcome might not vary monotoni-
cally with the status quo. To see this, consider again the case of legislators
bargaining over taxes, and suppose that a shift in investors’ sentiment over
the sustainability of the deﬁcit makes increasing taxes desirable. In that
case, all legislators may want to increase taxes, but the liberals will want
to increase them more. If the status quo tax rates are excessively low given
the needs and if the liberals can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, they will
propose a greater tax increase than what is optimal for the conservatives,
and the conservatives will have no choice but to accept it. In this case, a
slightly higher status quo would have constrained the bargaining power
of the liberals and resulted in a lower tax rate. When the status quo is en-
dogenous, the anticipation of this scenario biases the conservatives against
low taxes. Thus, the endogenous status quo can also have amoderating effect.
The two effects have opposite implications in terms of the dynamics of
the bargaining outcome. The polarizing effect induces players to disagree
more often than their current preferences do and thus leads to status quo
inertia. In contrast, the moderating effect biases players’ behavior toward
alternatives that are typically favored by the opponent. Therefore, it may
induce a player to agree on a policy change even if her current prefer-
ences do not favor it; that is, a new policy may be approved even if it is Pa-
reto dominated by the status quo. This means that moderation can lead to
status quo instability. Hence, whether the endogenous status quo induces
policy inertia as in the two-alternative model depends on which of these
two effects dominates. In Sections IV.B and IV.C, however, we identify
two arguably relevant environments in which the polarizing effect domi-
nates and status quo inertia prevails.15
In Section IV.B, we assume that within each period, the bargaining
outcome is selected through the consensus procedure (Gradstein 1999;
Dal Bó 2006; Riboni and Ruge-Murcia 2010): players revise the status quo
through a series of incremental changes. We show that under this within-
period bargaining procedure, the polarizing effect dominates. To under-
stand this result, note that from the above discussion, the polarizing effect
occurs irrespective of the within-period bargaining procedure. For the
moderating effect to occur, however, the bargaining procedure must favor
more drastic policy changes whenever players agree on the direction of the
change but not its magnitude. By virtue of being incremental, the consen-
sus procedure favors less drastic policy changes, thereby eliminating the
moderating effect.
There are reasons to believe that the consensus procedure is a reason-
able description of the negotiations that occur in some decision-making
bodies. First, since the seminal work of Lindblom (1959) and Wildavsky
(1992), a large body of literature on policy processes has found that pub-
lic decision making in pluralist societies tends to follow an incremental
approach that is in line with the consensus procedure. Second, Riboni
and Ruge-Murcia (2010) have found that in the case of monetary policy
committees, the consensus procedure delivers outcomes that are consis-
tent with empirical evidence.
In Section IV.C, we allow for a general class of within-period bargaining
procedures but consider instead an environment in which preferences
evolve smoothly over time and players are given the opportunity to revise
the status quo arbitrarily frequently. We show that in such environments,
status quo inertia prevails in equilibrium. To understand why, note that
from the abovediscussion, to generate the typeof disagreement that leads
to moderation, the preferences must change drastically from one period
to the next: players must agree on low taxes at some point in time, but
both must prefer to increase them substantially when the next chance
to renegotiate arises. Such events do not occur when players can revise
the policy agreement as soon as the environment prompts it. We believe
that the latter assumption is empirically relevant because in actual bar-
gaining situations, bargaining parties are rarely constrained onwhen they
can revise the status quo.88 Suppose, for instance, that legislators cut taxes after an economic contraction, but
quickly thereafter, the markets lose faith in the ability of the government to repay its debts.
In that scenario, the legislators are unlikely to wait for the next ordinary legislative session
to start negotiating over how to react to the new situation. Similarly, since 1981 the Federal
Open Market Committee has held eight regularly scheduled meetings each year at inter
vals of 5 8 weeks. If circumstances require, however, members may be called on to partic
ipate in a special meeting. For example, during the ﬁnancial crisis the committee met 11
times in 2007 and 14 in 2008 (source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy
/fomchistorical2008.htm).
16
B. Bargaining with the Consensus ProcedureThe set of alternativesX 5 fx1; x2;:::; xNg is a subset ofℝ, with x1 < ⋯ < xN .
As in the two-alternative model, we assume that the proﬁle of payoff func-
tions ðU kðv; xÞÞk∈fl ;rg;v∈Θ;x∈X is bounded and that player r is more rightist
than player l in the sense that naturally extends deﬁnition 1: For all v ∈ Θ
and all x, y ∈ X such that x < y, U lðv; yÞ U lðv; xÞ ≤ U rðv; yÞ U rðv; xÞ:
The game differs from the one analyzed in Section III only in that in
each period, the bargaining outcome is decided using the consensus pro-
cedure. That is, each period is divided into multiple stages. In the ﬁrst
stage, the proposer pr ∈ {l, r } (whose possibly random identity candepend
on the state v) can play left or right. If she plays right (left), then in the
subsequent stages of that period, players vote via the unanimity rule on
how far to the right (left) they should incrementally move the status quo.
Formally, if the status quo is xn, players vote on whether to move to xn11
(xn 1). If one of them votes no, the game stops. If both vote yes, xn11
(xn 1) becomes the temporary agreement for the next stage. In the next
stage, players vote on whether tomove to xn12 (xn 2), and so on. Bargaining
continues until one player plays no or until the temporary agreement is xN
(x1). The last temporary agreement x becomes the bargaining outcome for
that period, players obtain payoffs ðU kðv; xÞÞk∈fl ;rg; and the game moves to
the next period with x as the new status quo. The discounting d ∈ (0, 1)
occurs only between periods. We call this game Genc . Let G
ex
c denote the
game that differs from Genc in that the status quo in each period t is exog-
enously ﬁxed at some q(t).1. Conditions for Strategic PolarizationAs in the two-alternative model, the effect of the endogenous status quo
on equilibriumbehavior is captured by the value function q→W jkðv; qÞ: If
W jkðv; qÞ is increasing (decreasing) in q, player k favors replacing xn with
xn11 in more (fewer) states than under the exogenous status quo. Hence,
we will say that an equilibriumwith a strategy proﬁle j is polarized if for all
v ∈Θ,W jr ðv; qÞ is weakly increasing in q andW jl ðv; qÞ is weakly decreasing
in q.9
Proposition 5. IfΘ is ﬁnite, there exists an equilibrium of Genc that is
polarized.
We cannot ascertain that all equilibria are polarized, because if the pro-
poser is indifferent between choosing left and right for some status quos,
she can impose anonmonotonicmapping between the status quo and the9 Note that for FXF 2, if we set x1 L and x2 R, this deﬁnition of strategic polariza
tion is equivalent to the deﬁnition used in Sec. III.
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outcome. As explained in Section IV.A, this implies that the rightist (left-
ist) player may not necessarily prefer more rightist (leftist) status quos.
In assumption 1 below, we deﬁne a large class of environments in which
such indifferences occur with negligible probability and show that in
these environments, all equilibria are polarized. Assumption 1 requires
that players’ payoffs depend on a stochastic parameter v1(t) that is arbi-
trarily correlated across time and on a shock v2(t) that smoothly perturbs
the payoffs (condition i) but does not affect the distribution of future
payoffs (condition ii).
Assumption 1. In all periods t, the state can be decomposed into two
coordinates vðtÞ 5 ðv1ðtÞ; v2ðtÞÞ such that
i. conditioning on v1(t) and v1(t1 1), ðU kðv1ðt 1 1Þ; v2ðt 1 1Þ; xÞÞk∈fl ;rg;x∈X
has an absolutely continuous distribution on ℝfl ;rgX ;
ii. conditioning on v1(t), v1(t 1 1) and v2(t 1 1) are independent of
v2(t).Note that the payoff perturbation induced by v2(t) can have an arbi-
trarily small support. So the environment described in assumption 1 can
be viewed as an inﬁnitesimal perturbation of the environment in which the
(arbitrary) Markov process fv1ðtÞ : t ≥ 0g is the only payoff-relevant state.
Alternatively, if fv1ðtÞ : t ≥ 0g is deterministic, assumption 1 encompasses
the case inwhichplayers’payoffs are independently distributedover time.
Proposition 6. If assumption 1 is satisﬁed, then all equilibria are po-
larized. Furthermore, if Θ1 is ﬁnite, an equilibrium exists.2. The Case of Quadratic Preferences
and Random WalkPropositions 5 and 6 show that players’ equilibrium behavior exhibits stra-
tegic polarization but are silent on how the set of alternatives X affects the
magnitude of polarization. In this section, we analyze a reasonable environ-
ment in which it is independent of X and is exactly the same as in the two-
alternative model.
The proﬁle of payoff functions U is quadratic (see deﬁnition 2), and
the process {v(t) : t ∈ℕ} is a randomwalk onΘ 5 ℝ: for all t ∈ℕ, vðt 1 1Þ 5
vðtÞ1 nðtÞ, where the random variables ðnðtÞÞt∈ℕ are i.i.d. and integrable.10
We further assume that each n(t) admits a probability density function f
that is single-peaked with a peak at zero.10 The careful reader will note that since Θ ℝ; quadratic U violates the assumption
that U is bounded over Θ. However, the results stated in this section are derived without
this assumption.
18
Let us ﬁrst analyze the equilibrium behavior with an exogenous sta-
tus quo. Once the direction is chosen, say right, whenever voting be-
tween a temporary status quo xn and a change to xn11, the unique stage-
undominated action for each player is to vote yes if and only if xn11 is closer
to her peak than xn. Given this behavior at the voting stages, a stage-
undominated action for the proposer is to propose the direction of her
peak, and all stage-undominated actions are outcome equivalent.
Consider a period with state v and status quo xn. Since the payoffs are
quadratic, the strategy proﬁle described above moves the policy to the
right if both players prefer xn11 to xn, which happens when v ≥ ðxn11 1
xnÞ=2 bl : Likewise, the policy moves to the left if both players prefer
xn 1 to xn, which happens when v < ðxn 1 1 xnÞ=2 br :11 Hence, the status
quo xn stays in place if
v ∈
xn 1 xn 1
2
br ;
xn11 1 xn
2
bl
 
: ð5Þ
Proposition 7. There exist pl < 0 and pr > 0 such that for all ﬁnite
X ⊂ℝ, the equilibrium of Genc with players’ biases b1 p is an equilibrium
of the game Genc with players’ biases b.
Proposition 7 states that with an endogenous status quo, there exists an
equilibrium in which players behave as if the status quo were exogenous
but their biases were b1 p instead of b. Since bl < br and pl < 0 < pr, the stra-
tegic polarization again moves players further apart on the ideological
spectrum. Together with (5), proposition 7 implies that the status quo
xn stays in place when
v∈
xn 1 xn 1
2
ðbr 1 pr Þ;
xn11 1 xn
2
ðbl 1 plÞ
 
: ð6Þ
By comparing (5) and (6), we see that as in the two-alternativemodel, the
endogenous status quo increases status quo inertia, more so the greater
the polarizing effect p.
Note that proposition 7 states that pl and pr are independent of X.
Hence, the endogenous status quo generates the same magnitude of po-
larization and status quo inertia independent of the number and similar-
ity of the available alternatives. Moreover, since for FX F5 2 the equilibria
of Genc are outcome equivalent to the equilibria of G
en analyzed in Section
III.C, proposition 7 implies that the polarizing effect is exactly as in the
two-alternative model. Hence, consistent with the intuition laid out in
Section IV.A, there is no moderating effect in this setting.11 Recall that in the text we adopt the convention that players vote for the more rightist
alternative when indifferent.
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Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the equilibrium outcome in Genc ðfL;
M ;Rg; bÞ (solid lines) and Gexc ðfL;M ;Rg; bÞ (dashed lines). The horizon-
tal lines represent the set of states inwhich agiven status quo stays inplace,
and the arrows represent the cutoff states at which the policy switches.C. Bargaining in a Continuously Changing EnvironmentIn this section,wegeneralize themodel of Section IV.B in thatwe allow for a
broad class of within-period bargaining procedures but assume that pref-
erences evolve continuously and players can bargain arbitrarily frequently.
The set of alternatives X is ﬁnite. Time is continuous, but players bar-
gain only every D > 0 units of time. At each bargaining time t ∈ {0, D,
2D, . . .} with status quo q and state v, players play a within-period bargain-
ing procedure denoted by }ðv; qÞ whose outcome determines players’
ﬂow payoff for the period for [t, t 1 D) and becomes the status quo at
t 1 D. The state v(t) follows a continuous-time stochastic Markov process
on Θ. The ﬂow payoff of player k ∈ {l, r } in state v from alternative x ∈ X
is denoted by uk(v, x) and is uniformly bounded. Players maximize the
expected discounted sum of ﬂow payoffs, and r > 0 is the discount factor.
We denote this game by Gen} ðDÞ.
Before deriving the formal result, we use a simple example to illustrate
how polarization, moderation, and status quo inertia depend on D and
on }.1. A Numerical Example with the Agenda-Setter
ProcedureSuppose that X 5 { 1, 0, 1}, the proﬁle of ﬂow payoffs is quadratic (see
deﬁnition 2), and fvðtÞ : t ∈ℕg is a standard Brownian motion on Θ 5
ℝ: Conditional on v(t), v(t 1 D) is distributed according to N ðvðtÞ; Dp Þ:FIG. 2. The evolution of the policy20
If we set U kðv; xÞ 5 E vð0Þ v½∫D0 ½ukðvðtÞ; xÞre rtdt; then Uk(v, x) is quadratic
(modulo a constant). Hence, if } 5 c denotes the consensus procedure,
then the game Genc ðDÞ is equivalent to the game analyzed in Section IV.B
with d5 e rD and f being the density of the normal distribution with m 5
0 and j 5 D
p
:
Consider now the agenda-setter procedure, denoted by} 5 r ; in which
r makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer toplayer l in eachperiod. By analogywith
the equilibriumof Genc ðDÞ characterized inproposition 7, wepostulate the
following cutoff equilibrium of Genr ðDÞ: for each pair of consecutive alter-
natives, xn and xn11, there exists pxn ;xn11 and pxn11;xn such that when q 5 xn, r
proposes a change to the right when v ≥ ðxn 1 xn11Þ=2 ðbl 1 pxn ;xn11Þ;
and when q 5 xn11, r proposes a change to the left when v < ðxn 1
xn11Þ=2 ðbr 1 pxn11;xnÞ:All proposals of r are accepted by l.12 Note that this
equilibrium of Genr ðDÞ exhibits less polarization than the equilibrium of
Genc ðDÞ if pxn ;xn11 > pl and pxn11;xn < pr , where pl and pr are players’ degree of
strategic polarization in the equilibrium of Genc ðDÞ characterized in prop-
osition 7.
The intuition laid out in Section IV.A suggests that under the proce-
dure } 5 r , the moderating effect should bias player l in favor of a mod-
erate status quo q 5 0 relative to an extreme leftist one q 5 1 (and vice
versa for player r), that is, p 1,0 > pl and p0, 1 < pr. The reason is that when
both players want to move the policy to the right but disagree by how
much, a very leftist status quo q 5 1 allows the proposer r to force l to
accept a drastic change of policy to x5 1, while a moderate status quo q5
0 does not. However, the moderating effect should vanish as D → 0; that
is, p 1,0 pl and p0, 1 pr should tend to zero, because as players can revise
the policy sufﬁciently frequently, the probability that they agree on 1 in
some period but both prefer 1 in the next is negligible.
Figure 3 plots our numerical estimation of (pl, pr) (solid) and (p 1,0,
p0, 1) (dotted) as a function of D for r5 0.001. As intuited, the moderat-
ing effect arises in Genr ðDÞ but vanishes as D→ 0.13 Interestingly, ﬁgure 3
also shows that under both the consensus and the agenda-setter proce-
dures, players’ degree of polarization increases as D→ 0, so there is strict
status quo inertia in the limit.1412 This is only a partial description of the equilibrium but is sufﬁcient for the point made
in this example.
13 For all parameters we used, we also obtain that there is no moderation effect between
q 1 and q 0, i.e., p0,1 pl and p1,0 pr. The intuition for this result is that with a rightist
status quo, if both players want to move the policy to the left but disagree by how much,
under } r , the player who wants the more drastic change, i.e., l, never has any bargaining
power.
14 All simulation results are available from the authors on request.
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2. General Result: Status Quo InertiaThe only restriction we impose on } is that either player can unilaterally
block any change away from the status quo. Formally, for all v ∈Θ and q ∈
X, in any stage-undominated subgame perfect equilibrium of the stage
game }ðv; qÞ, with probability one, both players weakly prefer the equilib-
rium outcome to the status quo q.15 To capture the requirement that pref-
erences evolve smoothly over time, we assume that the state space Θ is a
topological space such that for all x ∈ X, uk(v, x) is continuous in v, and
the process {v(t) : t ≥ 0} satisﬁes the following condition.
Assumption 2. For all v ∈ Θ and all neighborhoods B of v, if t^ B de-
notes the ﬁrst exit time of v(t) fromB, then Prvð0Þ vð^t B ≤ tÞ 5 oðtÞ as t→ 0.16
Let fj(v, q ; x) denote the probability that x is implemented in a bar-
gaining period t if v(t) 5 v, q(t) 5 q, and players play strategy proﬁle jFIG. 3. Strategic polarization in Genc and G
en
r15 This assumption is satisﬁed, for instance, for any state dependent agenda setter pro
cedure and for the voting procedure from Sec. III. The consensus procedure satisﬁes this
restriction in any pure strategy equilibrium and in any mixed strategy equilibrium if as
sumption 1 holds. Our conclusions also hold in the case in which the bargaining outcome
within each period is determined by some cooperative bargaining solution such as the
Nash bargaining solution, where players’ payoffs are their continuation value from imple
menting a given alternative.
16 Assumption 2 is satisﬁed for all standard continuous Markov processes such as the
Brownian motion used in Sec. IV.C.1. See remark 1 in the online appendix. Note also that
if fvðtÞ : t ≥ 0g is deterministic, then assumption 2 is satisﬁed if and only if fvðtÞ : t ≥ 0g is
continuous. When Θ is a metric space, it is satisﬁed if fvðtÞ : t ≥ 0g is Lipschitz continuous
in t with probability one.
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in Gen} ðDÞ. Consider a sequence ðDsÞs∈ℕ such that Ds→ 0 and a sequence of
strategy proﬁles ðjsÞs∈ℕ such that for all s ∈ℕ, js is an equilibrium of
Gen} ðDsÞ. This sequence is ﬁxed throughout.
We are ready to state our result.
Proposition 8. Let v ∈Θ and q ∈ X. Suppose that there exists x ∈ X, a
neighborhood B of v, and some ε > 0 such that for s sufﬁciently large, for
all z ∈ B, fjsðz ; q; xÞ > ε and fjsðz; x; xÞ 5 1: Then for all k ∈ {l, r }, ukðv; xÞ ≥
ukðv; qÞ:
Proposition 8 characterizes the equilibrium behavior as D→ 0 only in
the states v in the neighborhood of which status quo q is replaced with a
nonvanishing probability by some bargaining outcome, which in turn is
not replaced immediately unless the state leaves the neighborhood of v.
However, in the equilibria characterized in Sections IV.B and IV.C.1, this
is the case for all q and almost all v.17
Proposition 8 states that when the negotiating parties can revise the bar-
gaining agreement sufﬁciently frequently, the status quo q can be replaced
by x in a neighborhood of some v only if x Pareto improves on q in terms of
the current preferences at v. Note that with an exogenous status quo, the
status quo q is replaced exactly when an alternative x Pareto improves on
q in terms of the current preferences. Hence, proposition 8 shows that if
the endogenous status quo distorts the dynamics of the bargaining out-
come relative to the exogenous status quo, this distortion can take the form
only of status quo inertia.V. Applications to Legislative BargainingMost laws and policies enacted by the US Congress are permanent: they
remain in effect until a new legislative action is taken.18 As such, they ﬁt17 To see this, note that these equilibria are in pure strategies and the set of states at
which a given action is prescribed is an interval of Θ ℝ. Hence, for any sequence
ðjsÞs∈ℕ of such equilibria and any q, there exists a subsequence in which these intervals con
verge. In any state v that does not coincide with the limit of the boundaries of these inter
vals, the actions and thus the bargaining outcome prescribed by js are locally constant
around v for s sufﬁciently large. Moreover, in these equilibria, the bargaining outcome
around v is not replaced unless the state changes. In general, there may be equilibria j that
prescribe q to be replaced by some y for which fjðz ; y; yÞ < 1 but that is replaced in state z by
some x for which fjðz ; x; xÞ 1 (which could happen in some equilibrium, for instance,
if G is the agenda setter, and x and y give exactly the same continuation payoff to the pro
poser in state z). Proposition 8 still holds in such cases, but the proof is more intricate. We
refer the interested reader to Dziuda and Loeper (2012).
18 Our model features two players, but in Dziuda and Loeper (2015), we extend it to an
arbitrary number of legislators and general voting rules. We show that if legislators’ relative
ideological positions are constant across time (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), the
voting rule determines two pivotal players whose agreement, as in the current model, is
necessary and sufﬁcient for a policy change in any equilibrium. As in the pivotal politics
literature (Krehbiel 1999; Brady and Volden 2006), the leftist (rightist) player in our model
can be interpreted as the most liberal (conservative) policy maker among the veto players.
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the assumptions of ourmodel. This is the case ofmandatory spendingpol-
icies, which include all entitlements and currently amount to 59 percent
of total federal spending (Levit and Austin 2014), constitutional amend-
ments, most statutes in the US code, the Senate’s rules of proceedings, or
international treaties. Likewise, changes to the tax code are permanent
unless legislators decide to attach a sunset provision, which historically
has been the exception rather than the norm.19A. Polarization and GridlockTheﬁnding of our paper that in a changing environment, the continuing
nature of policies leads to polarization and gridlock resonates with the ca-
sual observations of the proceedings in the US Congress. As a result of
changing demographics, new social risks, increasing public debt, and leg-
islative complexity, there is a general consensus that important continu-
ing policies such as entitlements, immigration laws, or the tax code are
in need of a serious overhaul. Yet legislators have repeatedly failed to
act on them.
Since there is a lot of disagreement in the US Congress also on tempo-
rary legislation (see, e.g., Keystone XL Pipeline), the endogenous status
quo is admittedly not the only source of polarization and legislative iner-
tia. As shown in the pivotal politics literature (Krehbiel 1999; Brady and
Volden 2006), supermajority requirements or veto points can create grid-
lock even for temporary legislation: as long as the status quo lies in be-
tween the ideal points of the two pivotal players—the “gridlock interval”—
any policy change will be vetoed. Our paper complements this literature
by showing that in a dynamic setting, the continuing nature of policies
makes these pivotal voters behave as if their ideal points were farther apart
(see Secs. III.E and IV.B) and thus increases the size of the gridlock inter-
val. Indeed, it may be telling that many controversial but temporary leg-
islations such as the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, the Patriot Act of
2001, the Troubled Asset Relief Program plan, or Obama’s ﬁscal stimulus
in 2008 passed relatively swiftly, while themuch needed reforms of the tax
code or the entitlement system have not even reached the ﬂoor.19 See, e.g., Posner and Verneule (2002, 1672, 1694, 1701) on the permanent nature of
statutes, the Senate’s internal rules, or international treaties. As for tax legislation, prior to
the Bush administration, sunsets appliedmainly to relatively small provisions known as “tax
extenders” (Gale and Orszag 2003). As Mooney (2004) puts it, “the use of sweeping sunset
provisions in the tax code under the Bush Administration [referring to the sunset provi
sions in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and the Jobs
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003] represents a massive departure from
previous tax policy.”
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Our results (proposition 4 and corollary 2) show that strategic polariza-
tion and status quo inertia increase with legislators’ discount rate. If legis-
lators care about policiesmore when in ofﬁce, their discount rate is linked
to their reelection probability. In the case of the US Congress, the incum-
bency reelection rate has been very high (above 80 percent in the Senate
and 90 percent in the House since the 1960s; see Friedman and Holden
2009, ﬁg. 1), which suggests that the inertial effect of the endogenous sta-
tus quo may be quite important. Our ﬁndings also suggest, counterintui-
tively, that political instability and term limits can be beneﬁcial.B. Legislators’ Ideology and PolarizationOur paper adds to the discussion on legislators’ ideology and polariza-
tion. Most of the literature measures legislators’ ideal points on the left-
right spectrum using Nominate scores derived from roll-call votes (Poole
and Rosenthal 1997). The implicit premise of this empirical exercise is
that legislators vote according to their true preferences. Our results imply
that when voting on permanent policy changes, legislators may bias their
voting behavior. As a result, Nominate scores may systematically overesti-
mate legislators’ ideological polarization.
The above observation resonates with the empirical ﬁndings in Bafumi
andHerron (2010) thatmembers of Congress aremore extreme than the
median voter of their respective constituency, where the former is mea-
sured by the voting record of the legislators and the latter by survey re-
sponses (see also Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006; Fiorina and Abrams
2008; Krasa and Polborn 2014). The difference between legislators’ and
voters’ polarization is usually interpreted as a failure of political represen-
tation. Our paper suggests an alternative interpretation: even if legislators’
preferences coincide with that of their median constituent, the voting rec-
ords of forward-looking legislators may exhibit more polarization than
the preferences expressed by their constituents in nonbinding surveys.
The implication of our model that Nominate scores might be biased
can be indirectly tested along the following lines. The voting behavior
on permanent legislations of a given liberal (conservative) legislator is
predicted to be more liberal (conservative) as her reelection probability
increases and as the other legislators becomemore polarized. In contrast,
these factors should not affect legislators’ behavior if they vote on tempo-
rary legislations or if they vote myopically as the Nominate methodology
implicitly assumes. Such an analysis may not be straightforward, as many
bills contain both types of policies, and legislators have some discretion
about which policy changes are temporary or permanent, whichmay create
anendogeneity problem. It is nevertheless interesting tonote that the steady
increase in the share ofmandatory spending in the federal budget since the25
1960s (Levit and Austin 2014) has been accompanied by a sharp increase
in polarization as measured by Nominate scores (McCarty et al. 2006).C. Temporary Legislation and Sunset ProvisionsThis paper shows that linking today’s agreement and tomorrow’s status
quo generates a detrimental polarizing effect. In the context of legislative
bargaining, there are twonatural ways to sever this link: the exogenous sta-
tus quo and sunset provisions.20
The exogenous status quo is arguably the most prevalent alternative to
the endogenous status quo. For example, discretionary spending poli-
cies (e.g., federal wages, “pork barrel” projects) require annual appropri-
ations and are thus legislated under a ﬁxed default of no spending (Levit
and Austin 2014). However, the determination of the exogenous default
policy can be controversial inmany policy domains. For instance, there is
arguably nonatural default for income taxationor social security beneﬁts.
Moreover, exogenous status quo is certain to be socially beneﬁcial only if
the default policy is set optimally in all states, but this may be hard to im-
plement if the optimal default policy depends on the state and the latter is
not veriﬁable.
A sunset provision is a clause that speciﬁes duration after which a leg-
islative act automatically expires. Although sunset provisions have re-
ceived little attention from economists, they have long been advocated
by political theorists and legal scholars to address statute proliferation
and obsolescence and political entrenchment of regulations and agen-
cies.21Our results suggest a novel rationale for sunsets: by allowing the leg-
islators to change the law without affecting the future status quo, sunsets
induce them to evaluate policies solely on the basis of their adequacy to
the current environment and hence eliminate the polarizing effect.
Legal scholars have pointed out that sunset provisions generate vari-
ous inefﬁciencies, which may discourage legislators from using them
(Posner and Vermeule 2002; Kysar 2011). It has also been observed that
even though sunset policy changes do not formally affect the status quo,20 Automatic stabilizers can also affect the dynamic linkage of the endogenous status
quo. An automatic stabilizer is a clause that triggers an automatic change in a continuing
policy in response to a change in certain observable indicators (e.g., price levels, unem
ployment rate). In a related paper, Bowen et al. (2014) show that the endogenous status
quo can be an optimal rule when the status quo can be fully contingent on the state of na
ture. In practice, however, veriﬁability may be an issue.
21 Jefferson ([1789] 1958), Lowi (1969), and Calabresi (1982) famously supported the
systematic use of sunset provision under various forms to avoid legislative obsolescence
and entrenchment. Sunset provisions have also been argued to improve scrutiny over
new policies with uncertain effects and improve legislative response to temporary circum
stances and new risks. See Gersen (2007) and the references therein.
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they make it politically harder to revert to it (Kysar 2011). Hence, the
availability and the use of sunsets may not completely eliminate the per-
verse dynamic incentives highlighted in this paper. We leave a formal
analysis of the role of sunset provisions in dynamic negotiations for fu-
ture research.
Appendix
A. Proofs for the Two Alternative Model
Notation
Let m be a bound on jU kðv; xÞj over all k ∈ {l, r }, v ∈ Θ, and x ∈ X, and let F be the
set of mappings from Θ into ½ m=ð1 dÞ;m=ð1 dÞ that are measurable with
respect to the sigma algebra S of Θ. In what follows, f ( fl, fr) denotes an arbi
trary pair of suchmappings, and 0F denotes the mapping that is equal to zero for
all v ∈ Θ. For all T ⊆ Θ and f ∈F 2; denote
D 0ð f Þ ≗ fv ∈ Θ : f
l
ðvÞ < 0 and f
r
ðvÞ > 0g;
D 00ð f Þ ≗ fv ∈ Θ : f
l
ðvÞ > 0 and f
r
ðvÞ < 0g;
I ð f Þ ≗ fv ∈ Θ : f
l
ðvÞ 0 or f
r
ðvÞ 0g;
DðT ; f Þ≗ D 0ð f Þ [ D 00ð f Þ [ ðI ð f Þ \ T Þ:
ðA1Þ
For all T ⊆ Θ, we deﬁne the mappings V and QT as follows: for all f ∈F 2; k ∈ {l , r },
and v ∈ Θ,
V kð f k ; vÞ ≗U kðvÞ1 df kðvÞ; ðA2Þ
QTk ð f ; vÞ ≗∫z∈DðT ;f Þ f kðzÞdP vðzÞ; ðA3Þ
where Pv denotes the probability distribution of v(t1 1), conditional on v(t) v.
When f is equal to the continuation valueW j of some strategy proﬁle j as deﬁned
inSection III.C, thenV kðW jk ; vÞ is the relative gain in continuation payoff for player
k of implementing alternative R instead of L in period t with state v(t) v in the
game Gen, conditional on j being played thereafter. Then D 0ðV ðW jÞÞ and D 00
ðV ðW jÞÞ are the set of states in which players would strictly prefer to implement
different alternatives given the continuation play j, and I ðV ðW jÞÞ is the set of
states in which some player is indifferent between the alternatives. Thus, the set
DðT ;V ðW ÞÞ can be viewed as the set of states in which players disagree, with the
convention that they disagree when they strictly prefer implementing different
alternatives (i.e., when v ∈ D 0ðV ðW jÞÞ [ D 00ðV ðW jÞÞ) and when some player is in
different and the state is in T. Hence, the set T can be viewed as an arbitrary tie
breaking rule that speciﬁes how players vote when they are indifferent. Finally,
QTk ðV ðW jÞ; vÞ is the expectation of the relative gain for player k of implementing
alternativeR instead of L in period t1 1, conditional on v(t) v, on continuation
play j, and on players disagreeing in t 1 1 in the above sense.27
We denote by (≤, ≥) the partial order on F 2 deﬁned as follows: for all f, g ∈F 2,
f (≤, ≥) g if, for all v ∈Θ, fl(v)≤ gl(v) and fr(v)≥gr(v).When f and g are continuation
values of strategy proﬁles, this order corresponds to the polarization order on
strategy proﬁles deﬁned before proposition 2.
Preliminary Lemmas
The following two lemmas show that a strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium if andonly
if its continuation value is a ﬁxed point of the map f→ (QT ∘ V )( f ) and establish
that this map is monotonic in the order (≤, ≥).
Lemma 1. If j is an equilibrium of Gen, then there existsT ⊂Θ such thatW j is a
ﬁxedpoint of themap f →ðQT ∘V Þð f Þ; and jprescribes players’ votes todisagree in
state v if and only if v∈DðT ;V ðW jÞÞ. Conversely, if W is a ﬁxed point of f→
ðQT ∘V Þð f Þ for some T ⊂ Θ, then there exists an equilibrium j of Gen such that
W j W and j prescribes players’ votes to disagree in state v if and only if v∈
DðT ;V ðW ÞÞ:
Proof. Let j be an equilibrium and W j be the corresponding continuation
value. Recall thatW jk is the relative gain in continuation payoff for player k evalu
ated in t from having R instead of L as t 1 1 status quo. The status quo in t 1 1
affects the outcome in t1 1 only if players’ votes disagree in that period. By stage
undomination, this happens when vðt 1 1Þ∈DðT ;V ðW jÞÞ for someT ⊂Θ (see the
explanation in the notation subsection). For such realizations of v(t1 1), either
status quo stays in place, so that the gain in continuation payoff of having status
quo R relat i ve to L i s V kðW j; vðt 1 1ÞÞ: This means thatW j is the expectation
of V kðW j; vðt 1 1ÞÞ over all disagreement states vðt 1 1Þ ∈ DðT ;V ðW jÞÞ, condi
tional on v(t) v; so from (A3), W j QT ðV ðW jÞÞ:
Reciprocally, letW ∈F 2 be such thatW QT ðV ðW ÞÞ for some T ⊂Θ. Consider
the following Markov strategy proﬁle j: for all v ∈ Θ, (i) player k votes for R if
U kðvÞ1 dW kðvÞ > 0 and for L when U kðvÞ1 dW kðvÞ < 0; (ii) if U kðvÞ1 dW kðvÞ
0, then player k votes for a different alternative than her opponent if and only if
v ∈ T. Hence, j prescribes players to vote for different alternatives in state v if
and only if v ∈ DðT ;V ðW ÞÞ: By deﬁnition, the corresponding continuation value
W j is given by the expectation of V ðW ; vðt 1 1ÞÞ conditional on v(t) over all the
states in which players’ votes disagree. Therefore, for all v ∈ Θ,
W jkðvÞ ∫z∈DðT ;V ðW ÞÞ½U kðzÞ1 dW jkðzÞdP vðzÞ: ðA4Þ
Equation (A4) can be seen as a functional equation in W j, and since W
QT ðV ðW ÞÞ; this equation is given by a solution toW j W. The right hand side of
(A4) is a d contraction inW j for the sup norm. Therefore, (A4) has a unique solu
tion, which implies thatW j W. So by construction of j, j prescribes each player
k to vote for R when U kðvÞ1 dW jkðvÞ > 0 and for L when U kðvÞ1 dW jkðvÞ < 0,
which means that both players use stage undominated strategies. So j is an equi
librium. QED
Lemma 2. For all T ⊆ Θ and all f, g ∈ F 2 such that f ð≤; ≥Þg ð≤; ≥Þð0F; 0F Þ; the
map QT ∘ V is monotonic in the sense that ðQT ∘V Þð f Þð≤; ≥ÞðQT ∘V Þðg Þ.
≤ ≤ ≥ ≤ ≥ F FProof.?Using?the?assumptions?Ul?Ur?and?f?ð?;?Þg?ð?;?Þð0?;?0?Þ?in?(A2),?we?ob?tain?V?l?ðf?
Þ?≤?V?l?ðg?Þ?≤?V?r?ðg?Þ?≤?V?r?ðf?Þ:?Using?the?latter?inequalities?in?(A1),?28
?????tain?that?D00ðV?ðf?ÞÞ?D00ðV?ðg?ÞÞ?∅?and?that?D0ðV?ðg?ÞÞ?[?ðI?ðg?Þ \ T?Þ?is?included?
in?D0ðV?ðf?ÞÞ?[?ðI?ðf?Þ \ T?Þ:?From?(A3),
ðQTr ∘V Þð f ; vÞ ðQTr ∘V Þðg ; vÞ ∫D 0ðV ð f ÞÞ[ðI ð f Þ\T ÞVr ð f r ; zÞdP vðzÞ
∫
D0 ðV ðg ÞÞ[ðI ðg Þ\T ÞVr ðg r ; zÞdP vðzÞ:
Since the ﬁrst integral on the right hand side of the above equality integrates larger
andpositive values over a larger set than the second integral, the left hand sidemust
be positive. An analogous proof shows that ðQTl ∘V Þð f ; vÞ ≤ ðQTl ∘V Þðg ; vÞ. QED
Proofs for Section III.C
Proof of Proposition 1
Let W be the continuation value of some equilibrium. From lemma 1, W
QT ðV ðW ÞÞ for some T ⊂ Θ. Using the notations (A2) and (A3), this means that
for all v ∈ Θ,
Wr ðvÞ WlðvÞ ∫
DðT ;V ðW ÞÞ½U r ðzÞ UlðzÞ1 dðWr ðzÞ
WlðzÞÞdP vðzÞ:
ðA5Þ
Using the assumption that U r U l ≥ 0; (A5) implies that for all v ∈ Θ, W r ðvÞ
WlðvÞ ≥ 0:22 Substituting the last two inequalities in (A2), we obtain Vr ðW r Þ ≥
V lðW lÞ. From (A1), this implies that D 00ðV ðW ÞÞ ∅; so DðT ;V ðW ÞÞ
D 0ðV ðW ÞÞ [ ðI ðV ðW ÞÞ \ T Þ: Moreover, from (A1), for all z ∈ D 0ðV ðW ÞÞ [
ðI ðV ðW ÞÞ \ T Þ;V lðW ; zÞ ≤ 0 ≤ V r ðW ; zÞ. From (A3), this shows that QT ðV ðW ÞÞð≤;
≥Þ0; and thus W ð≤; ≥Þ0. QED
Proof of Proposition 2
Deﬁne the sequence ðW zÞz∈ℕ recursively as follows: for all v ∈Θ,W 0ðvÞ ð0F; 0F Þ,
and for all z ≥ 0,W z11 ðQ∅∘V ÞðW zÞ. Below, we show that ðW zÞz∈ℕ is monotonic,
is bounded, and thus converges (steps 1 and 2); its limit is the continuation value
of a least polarized equilibrium (steps 3 6), and this equilibrium is Pareto best
(step 7). Throughout, W is an arbitrary mapping such that W ð≤; ≥ÞðQ∅∘V ÞðW Þ
andW ð≤; ≥Þð0F ; 0F Þ:23
Step 1: For all z ∈ ℕ,W ð≤; ≥ÞW z11ð≤; ≥ÞW z:
We prove this by induction on z. Since W 0 ð0F; 0F Þ, V ðW 0Þ U ; and since
U l ≤ U r ;V lðW 0Þ ≤ V r ðW 0Þ: Using the latter inequality in (A1), we obtain22 To see this, letw ≗ inf v∈ΘðW r ðvÞ2W lðvÞÞ and let ðvnÞn∈ℕ be a sequence of states such that
W r ðvnÞ2W l ðvnÞ→w :Thenfrom(A5), for alln ∈ℕ,W r ðvnÞ2W lðvnÞ ≥ dwP vn ðDðT ;V ðW ÞÞÞ:
Since 0 ≤ P vn ≤ 1, there exists a subsequence along which ðP vn ðDðT ;V ðW ÞÞÞÞn∈ℕ converges to
some p ∈ [0, 1]. Taking the limit along this subsequence, we obtain w ≥ dwp; so w ≥ 0, as
needed.
23 Such amapping exists, e.g., the greatest element ofF 2 in the order (≤, ≥): for all v ∈Θ,
W ðvÞ≗ ð2m=ð12 dÞ;m=ð12 dÞÞ. The reason why we allow W to be any such mapping will
be clear in the proofs of propositions 3 and 7.
29
D 00ðV ðW 0ÞÞ ∅; and thus Dð∅;V ðW 0ÞÞ D 0ðV ðW 0ÞÞ, so for all v ∈
Dð∅;V ðW 0ÞÞ;V lðW 0; vÞ ≤ 0 ≤ V r ðW 0; vÞ: Using the latter inequality in (A3), we
obtain ðQ∅∘V ÞðW 0Þð≤; ≥Þð0F; 0F Þ or, equivalently, W 1ð≤; ≥ÞW 0: Moreover, since
W ð≤; ≥Þð0F ; 0F Þ W 0; lemma 2 implies that ðQ∅∘V ÞðW Þð≤; ≥ÞðQ∅∘V ÞðW 0Þ;which,
together with the assumption that W ð≤; ≥ÞðQ∅∘V ÞðW Þ, implies that W ð≤; ≥ÞW 1:
This completes the proof of step 1 for z 0. Suppose now thatW ð≤; ≥ÞW zð≤; ≥Þ ⋯
ð≤; ≥ÞW 0 for some z ≥ 0. Then lemma 2 implies that ðQ∅∘V ÞðW Þð≤; ≥ÞW z11
ð≤; ≥ÞW z; which, together with W ð≤; ≥ÞðQ∅ ∘V ÞðW Þ, completes the induction ar
gument.
Step 2: The sequence ðW zÞz∈ℕ converges pointwise to someW∞ such thatW ð≤; ≥Þ
W ∞.
From step 1, for all v ∈ Θ, the sequence ðW zkÞðvÞ is bounded and increasing
(decreasing) in z for k r (k l). As such, it converges to some W ∞k ðvÞ. The in
equality W ð≤; ≥ÞW ∞ follows directly from step 1.
Step 3: If 1S denotes the indicator function of a set S ⊆ Θ; then 1Dð∅;V ðW zÞÞ is in
creasing in z and converges pointwise to 1Dð∅;V ðW ∞ÞÞ:
SinceW zð≤; ≥ÞW 0; the same reasoning as in step 1 shows that for all z ∈ℕ [ {∞},
Dð∅;V ðW zÞÞ D 0ðV ðW zÞÞ, so 1Dð∅;V ðW zÞÞ 1D 0 ðV ðW zÞÞ: From (A2) and step 1, V(Wz)
is increasing in z for the order (≤, ≥), so from (A1), 1D 0 ðV ðW zÞÞ is increasing. Now let
v be such that 1D 0 ðV ðW ∞ÞÞðvÞ 1: Then V lðW ∞ÞðvÞ < 0 < V r ðW ∞Þ:
Since V is continuous in W, for z sufﬁciently large, V lðW zÞðvÞ < 0 < V r ðW zÞðvÞ,
so limz→∞1D 0 ðV ðW zÞÞðvÞ 1. Reciprocally, suppose limz→∞1D 0ðV ðW zÞÞðvÞ 1: Then for
some z, V lðW zÞðvÞ < 0 < V r ðW zÞðvÞ, and since V(W z) is increasing in z for the or
der (≤, ≥), V lðW ∞ÞðvÞ < 0 < V r ðW ∞Þ, so 1D 0 ðV ðW ∞ÞÞðvÞ 1:
Step 4: W ∞ is a ﬁxed point of Q∅ ∘ V.
For all z ∈ ℕ, k ∈ {l, r }, and v ∈ Θ,
W z11k ðvÞ ðQ∅∘V ÞkðW zÞðvÞ
∫
z∈Θ
1Dð∅;V ðW zÞðzÞ  ½U kðvÞ1W zkðzÞdP vðzÞ:
From step 2, the ﬁrst term of the above equation tends toW ∞(v) as z → ∞. Using
steps 2 and 3 together with Lebesgue’s monotone convergence theorem, the last
term tends to ðQ∅∘V ÞðW ∞ÞðvÞ.
Step 5: For any equilibrium j,W j (≤, ≥)W ∞.
From lemma 1, there exists T ⊆ Θ such that W j ðQT ∘V ÞðW jÞ and players’
votes disagree in j when v∈DðT ;V ðW jÞÞ: As shown in the proof of proposition 1,
in all disagreement states v∈DðT ;V ðW jÞÞ, V lðW j; vÞ ≤ 0 ≤ V r ðW j; vÞ: Substi
tuting this inequality and Dð∅;V ðW jÞÞ⊆DðT ;V ðW jÞÞ into (A3), we obtain
ðQT ∘V ÞðW jÞð≤; ≥ÞðQ∅∘V ÞðW jÞ; and thus W jð≤; ≥ÞðQ∅∘ V ÞðW jÞ: Hence, W j satis
ﬁes the condition for being W : From step 2, W jð≤; ≥ÞW ∞:
Step 6:W ∞ is the continuation value of a least polarized equilibrium j∞ in which
players’ votes disagree in a smaller set of states (in the inclusion sense) than in any
other equilibrium.
Step 4 and lemma 1 imply that W∞ is the continuation value of some equilib
rium j∞, and from step 5, j∞ is less polarized than any other equilibrium j. Let
v ∈Θ be a state in which players’ votes disagree in j∞. As established in the proof of
proposition 1, V lðW ∞; vÞ ≤ 0 ≤ V r ðW ∞; vÞ; and from lemma 1, v ∈ Dð∅;V ðW ∞ÞÞ,
so necessarily, V lðW ∞; vÞ < 0 < V r ðW ∞; vÞ: Since W jð≤; ≥ÞW ∞; this implies that30
V lðW j; vÞ < 0 < V r ðW j; vÞ, and stage undomination implies that players’ votes al
so disagree in j in state v.
Step 7: j∞ is Pareto better than any other equilibrium j.
Suppose that both players deviate from j∞ to the behavior prescribed by j only
in t 0. From step 6, players disagree in more states under j than under j∞.
Therefore, the deviation from j∞ to j in t 0 can change the outcome at t 0
only if under j∞ players agree to change the status quo while under j the status
quo remains. Suppose without loss of generality that q(0) R , and hence L is
implemented under j∞ while R stays in place under j. Since players play their
equilibrium strategy j∞ in the subgame starting in t 1, the net effect of this
deviation for player k is U kðvð0ÞÞ1 dW ∞k ðvð0ÞÞ. Since both players vote for L un
der j∞,U kðvð0ÞÞ1 dW ∞k ðvð0ÞÞmust be nonpositive for both k ∈ {l, r }, which implies
that the deviation weakly decreases the payoff of both players. Consider now the
strategy proﬁle in which players play j in t 0 and j∞ afterward, and let players
deviate from that proﬁle by playing according to j also in t 1. The same reason
ing as above shows that this deviation further decreases the payoffs of both players
irrespective of the status quo distribution in t 1. By induction on the number of
periods in which players deviate from j∞ to j, step 7 follows.
Step 8: A most polarized equilibrium exists and is Pareto worst.
The proof follows the same logic as steps 1 7 with the sequence ðW zÞz∈ℕ de
ﬁned recursively as follows: W 0 is the greatest element of F (i.e., W ðvÞ
ð m=ð1 dÞ;m=ð1 dÞÞ for all v ∈ Θ), and for all z ≥ 0, W z11 ðQΘ∘V ÞðW zÞ:
We omit the details for brevity. QED
Proofs for Section III.D
Proof of Proposition 3
Let V and V 0 refer to the maps deﬁned in (A2) and let j and j0 be least polarized
equilibria corresponding to (U, d) and to (U 0, d0), respectively, as constructed in
the proof of proposition 2. As shown in step 2 of that proof, W ð≤; ≥ÞW j for any
W such that (i) W ð≤; ≥Þð0F ; 0F Þ and (ii) W ð≤; ≥ÞðQ∅∘V ÞðW Þ: Hence, to prove
proposition 3, it sufﬁces to show that parts i and ii are satisﬁed for W W j
0
. In
equality i follows from proposition 1. To prove ii, note that as shown in the proof
of proposition 2,W j
0 ðQ∅∘V 0ÞðW j0 Þ. Moreover, from (A2),
V 0ðW j0 Þ V d
0
d
W j
0
1
1
d
ðU 0 U Þ
 
;
and since d0 > d and U 0ð≤; ≥ÞU ;
d0
d
W j
0
1
1
d
ðU 0 U Þ
 
ð ≤ ; ≥ÞW j0 ð ≤ ; ≥Þð0F ; 0F Þ:
Together with lemma 2, this implies that
W j
0 ðQ∅∘V 0ÞðW j0 Þ
ðQ∅∘V Þ d
0
d
W j
0
1
1
d
ðU 0 U Þ
 
ð ≤ ; ≥ÞðQ∅∘V ÞðW j0 Þ:31
The proof for the most polarized equilibrium follows the same steps and is omit
ted for brevity. QEDProof of Proposition 4
Suppose that jgl is not a best response for player l to j
g
r : From the one step
deviation principle, this is true if and only if for some v ∈ Θ, conditional on
v(0) v, player l is better off voting for R than for L at t 0, given that she ex
pects jg to be played in all future periods. By deﬁnition of jg, this is equivalent
to saying that for v(0) v, player l is better off with alternative R in all periods
than with alternative L in all periods. Hence, jgl is not a best response for player l
to jgr if and only if condition (3) is violated for player l. A symmetric argument
for player r completes the proof. QEDProof of Corollary 2
Since Uk(v) is bounded by m on Θ, for all T > 0,
E vð0Þ
"
o
∞
t50
dtU lðvðtÞÞ
#
E vð0Þ
"
o
T 1
t50
dtðU lðvðtÞÞ E ∗½U lð~vÞÞ
1o
∞
t5T
dtðU lðvðtÞÞ E ½U lð~vÞÞ
#
1
E ½U lð~vÞ
1 d
≤
2mð1 dT Þ
1 d
1 o
∞
t5T
dt jE vð0Þ½U lðvðtÞÞ E ½U lð~vÞj1 E ½U lð
~vÞ
1 d
:
Since E ½U lð~vÞ ≠ 0, by deﬁnition of uniform ergodicity, one can choose T large
enough such that for all t ≥ T and all v ∈ Θ, jE vð0Þ v½U lðvðtÞÞ E ½U lð~vÞj <
jE ½U lð~vÞj=2:Moreover, there exists dl < 1 such that for all d ∈ ½dl ; 1Þ; 2mð1 dT Þ <
jE ½U lð~vÞj=2: Substituting these bounds in the above inequality, we obtain that
for all d ≥ dl and all v ∈ Θ,
E vð0Þ v o
∞
t50
dtU lðvðtÞÞ
" #
<
jE ½U lð~vÞj
2ð1 dÞ 1 o
∞
t5T
dt
 !
jE ½U lð~vÞj
2
1
E ½U lð~vÞ
1 d
< 0:
A symmetric argument holds for the rightist player for some threshold dr < 1:
Setting d maxfdl ; drg completes the proof. QED
B. Proofs for the N Alternative Model
For the sake of brevity, we outline here only themain steps of the arguments. The
omitted steps can be found in the online appendix.32
Proofs for Section IV.B
Notation. The set of Markov states of the game Genc ; denoted by S, comprises
three kinds of states: direction states, in which the proposer must choose a direc
tion; voting states, in which players vote simultaneously; and payoff states, in which
players have no actions to choose, the current agreement is implemented, and
players receive the corresponding payoff. A typical direction state and payoff
state of Genc are denoted by hv, xi and hhv, xii, respectively, where v ∈ Θ is the
period speciﬁc state of nature and x ∈ X is the current agreement or the ﬁnal
agreement, respectively. A typical voting state is denoted by hv, x, x 0i, where v
and x have the same interpretation as in hv, xi, and x 0 is the proposal under con
sideration. For any Markov strategy proﬁle j and any state s ∈ S, V jkðsÞ denotes the
expected continuation payoff of player k from state s given continuation play j,
and fj(s) denotes the (possibly stochastic) outcome in a given period, starting
from state s and given continuation play j.
The following lemma formalizes the intuition laid out in Section IV.A that the
endogenous status quo has a polarizing effect whenever the bargaining proce
dure is such that in each period the outcome is monotonic in the status quo.
Lemma 3. Let j be an equilibrium of Genc . If for all v ∈ Θ and Pv almost all z ∈
Θ, the distribution of ðfjðhz ; qiÞÞ
q∈X is monotonic in q in the ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance sense, then j is polarized.24
Proof. Since the distribution of the outcome is almost alwaysmonotonic in the
status quo and since the outcome in a given period becomes the status quo in the
next period, a straightforward induction shows that for all v ∈ Θ, conditional on
v(t) v, for all t 0 ≥ t 1 1 and almost all realizations of v(t 0), the distribution of
the outcome in t 0 is monotonic in the status quo in period t1 1. Since Ur is more
rightist than Ul, this implies that for all v ∈ Θ and all xn, xn11∈X , W jr ðv; xn11Þ
W jr ðv; xnÞ ≥ W jl ðv; xn11Þ W jl ðv; xnÞ: Since for any direction state hz, xi, V jðhz ;
xiÞ Efj ½U ðfjðhz ; qiÞÞ1 dW jðfjðhz ; qiÞÞ, the previous inequality implies that
for all z ∈ Θ such that ðfjðhz ; qiÞÞ
q∈X is monotonic in q,
V jr ðhz ; xn11iÞ V jr ðhz; xniÞ ≥ V jl ðhz; xn11iÞ V jl ðhz ; xniÞ:
It is easy to show (online appendix claim 1) that if j is an equilibrium, V jkðhz ;
xn11iÞ V jkðhz ; xniÞ cannot have the same strict sign for both players. Together
with the above inequality, this implies thatV jkðhz ; xn11iÞ V jkðhz ; xniÞ is weakly pos
itive (negative) for k r (k l). SinceW jðv; qÞ ∫z∈ΘV jkðhz ; qiÞdP vðzÞ; this implies
that W jkðv; qÞ is weakly increasing (decreasing) in q for k r (k l), as needed.
QED
Proof of Proposition 5
For all Markov strategy proﬁles j of Genc , k ∈ {l, r }, and v ∈ Θ, let jk(v) and
jk( v) denote the restriction of jk to the Markov states in which the state of24 That is, for all q 0 > q and all x ∈ X, the probability that the outcome is to the right of x is
weakly greater under fjðhz ; q 0iÞ than under fjðhz; qiÞ.
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nature is v and to those in which the state of nature is different from v, respec
tively. Let k 0 denote the opponent of k. For a given jk( v) and jk0 ; we say that
j*kðvÞ is a stage undominated best response to jk( v) and jk 0 if j*kðvÞ prescribes
stage undominated actions in all Markov states with state of nature v given con
tinuation play ðj*kðvÞ; jkð vÞ; jk 0 Þ in Genc . Let ΣjkðvÞ denote the set of such stage
undominated best responses. Note that ΣjkðvÞ depends on j only through jk( v)
and jk 0 . If we denote Σj ≗ ðΣjl ðvÞ;Σjr ðvÞÞv∈Θ, then by construction of Σj, a strategy
proﬁle j is an equilibrium of Genc if and only if j ∈ Σ
j.
If k is the proposer when the state of nature is v, then j*kðvÞ∈ΣjkðvÞ is called
monotonic if ðfj*k ðvÞ;jk0 ðvÞðhv; qiÞÞ
q∈X is monotonic in q in the sense of lemma 3. Let
Σ^jkðvÞ⊆ΣjkðvÞ denote the set of monotonic, stage undominated best responses. If
k is not the proposer in state v, we simply set Σ^jkðvÞ≗ΣjkðvÞ. From lemma 3, to prove
the existence of a polarized equilibrium, it sufﬁces to show that the correspon
dence j→ Σ^j has a ﬁxed point. However, one cannot resort to the usual ﬁxed
point theorems based on continuity and convex valuedness, because Σ^j is typically
not convex. To circumvent this problem, we use the following theorem due to
Eilenberg and Montgomery (1946, theorem 1).25
Theorem 1. If C is a compact and convex subset of a Euclidean space and F :
C→ 2C is an upper hemicontinuous, contractible valued correspondence, then F
has a ﬁxed point.
In our case, C is the set of Markov strategy proﬁles of Genc . Since Θ is ﬁnite, C
satisﬁes the conditions of the theorem. Thus, to complete the proof, it sufﬁces to
show that j→ Σ^j is upper hemicontinuous and contractible valued. The former
property follows from standard continuity arguments.
We now sketch the argument for the contractibility of Σ^j; the detailed proof
can be found in claim 2 in the online appendix. By the standard argument, for
all j, v ∈ Θ, and k ∈ {l, r }, there exists j*kðvÞ ∈ ΣjkðvÞ: Moreover, j0kðvÞ ∈ ΣjkðvÞ if and
only if it differs from j*kðvÞ at most in Markov states in which player k is indifferent
between the two possible continuation states, given continuation play ðj*kðvÞ;
jkð vÞ; jk 0 Þ:Hence, one can ﬁnd j*kðvÞ ∈ ΣjkðvÞ such that in any voting state and di
rection state in which k is indifferent between the continuation states, j*kðvÞ pre
scribes k to play no and left, respectively. We prove that j*kðvÞ is monotonic, and
thus j*kðvÞ ∈ Σ^jðvÞ.
By deﬁnition, Σ^jkðvÞ is contractible if there exists a > 0; jkðvÞ ∈ Σ^jkðvÞ, and a con
tinuous function f : ½0; a  Σ^jkðvÞ→ Σ^jkðvÞ suchthat forallj0kðvÞ ∈ Σ^jðvÞ; f ð0; j0kðvÞÞ
j0kðvÞ and f ða ; j0kðvÞÞ jkðvÞ:We use a 2; jkðvÞ j*kðvÞ, and the following func
tion f : for any j0kðvÞ∈ Σ^j; as a increases from zero to one, the probability with
which f ða; j0kðvÞÞ prescribes k to play no when indifferent increases continuously
to one, and as a increases from one to two, the probability with which f ða; j0kðvÞÞ
prescribes k to play left when indifferent increases continuously to one. We show25 This result is actually a corollary from Eilenberg and Montgomery (1946, theorem 1);
see Reny (2011, 503). In Reny’s paper, C is an absolute retract, but any convex subset of a
Euclidean space is an absolute retract, and F is also required to be nonempty valued; but
this is implied by F being contractible valued.
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that f transforms any j0kðvÞ into j*kðvÞwhile preserving the best response andmono
tonicity properties of j0kðvÞ. QED
Proof of Proposition 6
Let j be an equilibrium of Genc . Assumption 1(ii) implies thatW
j(v, q) depends on
v only via v1. Since V ðhhz; xiiÞ U ðz; xÞ1 dW jðz1; qÞ; assumption 1(i) implies
that for all v ∈ Θ and Pv almost all z, the preferences induced by ðV ðhhz ; xiiÞÞx∈X
are strict, so the outcome fjðhz; qiÞ is deterministic and monotonic in q. Deter
minism follows from a simple backward induction starting from the states hz ;
x2; x1i and hz ; xN 1; xN i. To show monotonicity, suppose by contradiction that
for some xn, xn11 ∈X , fjðhz ; xniÞ > fjðhz ; xn11iÞ. This implies that fjðhz; xniÞ > xn
orfjðhz; xn11iÞ < xn11: Suppose the former; the proof in the latter case is identical.
Then theproposer canobtainfjðhz; xniÞby playing right in hz ; xn11i: Since shehas
strict preferences and j is an equilibrium, this implies that
V jpr ðhhz ;fjðhz ; xn11iÞiiÞ > V jpr ðhhz ;fjðhz ; xniÞiiÞ:
But she can also obtain the outcome fjðhz; xn11iÞ from state hz, xni by voting
no when the path of play reaches hz ; xn11; xn12i (if fjðhz ; xn11iÞ xn11) or by play
ing left in hz, xni and j thereafter (if fjðhz ; xn11iÞ < xn11), a proﬁtable deviation.
Lemma 3 implies then that j is polarized. The argument for existence when Θ1
is ﬁnite is standard and hence is relegated to the online appendix (see the proof
of equilibrium existence for proposition 6). QED
Sketch of the Proof of Proposition 7
For all b ∈ℝ2; letUbdenote theproﬁle of quadratic current preferenceswithbiases
b, and for all ﬁnite subsets X of ℝ; let Gexc ðX ;U bÞ and Genc ðX ;U bÞ denote the game
with an exogenous and endogenous status quo, respectively, in which players’ cur
rent preferences are Ub and the set of alternatives is X.
For anypair of alternatives x, y ∈ℝ, the gameGenc ðfx; yg;U bÞ is strategically equiv
alent to the two alternative game analyzed in Section III.C. Hence, using argu
ments similar to those in the proof of proposition 2, one can show that in the least
polarizing equilibrium of the game Genc ðfx; yg;U bÞ; players’ intertemporal prefer
ences over {x, y} coincide ordinally with U b1p* with p*l < 0 < p*r : Moreover, the ran
dom walk assumption implies that p* does not depend on {x, y} (claim 3 in the
online appendix).
Let jexðX ;U b1p*Þ denote the equilibrium of Gexc ðX ;U b1p*Þ; as described in Sec
tion IV.B. One can show (step 2 in the proof of proposition 7 in the online ap
pendix) that when jexðX ;U b1p*Þ is played in Genc ðX ;U bÞ; players’ intertemporal
preferences over any pair of consecutive alternatives {x, y} ∈ X coincide with their
intertemporal preferences in the least polarized equilibrium of Genc ðfy; zg;U bÞ:
Therefore, the intertemporal preferences induced by jexðX ;U b1p*Þ in Genc ðX ;U bÞ
over consecutive alternatives coincide ordinally with U b1p* : The single peakedness
of U b1p* implies then that they coincide over the entire X. One can then conclude
(step 1 in the proof of proposition 7 in the online appendix) that since jexðX ;35
U b1p*Þ is an equilibrium of Gexc ðX ;U b1p*Þ, this implies that jexðX ;U b1p*Þ is also an
equilibrium of Genc ðX ;U bÞ: QEDProof for Section IV.C: Sketch of the Proof of Proposition 8
The intuition for this proof is simple: if in equilibrium q is replaced by x at some
bargaining time t, then player k can veto this change and stay at q until x replaces q
again. If preferences evolve smoothly andplayers bargain frequently, x will indeed
replace q a small instant later with large probability. If q gives player k a higher cur
rent payoff than x in a neighborhood of v, this deviation is proﬁtable.
More formally, suppose by contradiction that, in equilibrium, status quo q is re
placed by x in some state v such that ukðv; xÞ > ukðv; qÞ:By continuity ofu,ukðz ; qÞ >
ukðz ; xÞ1 u for some u > 0 for all z ∈ B 0, where B 0 is a neighborhood v included in
the neighborhood B of the statement of the proposition. Consider the following
deviation in some period with (v, q): player k vetoes the change from q to x in that
period, and in all consecutive periods she vetoes any move from q until the equi
librium strategies prescribe players to replace q by x. If, under this deviation, x is
implemented before the state exits B 0, then this deviation gives a ﬂow payoff gain
of at least u to k before x is implemented and leads to the same path of play after
that. Using assumption 2 and the assumption on the behavior of the equilibrium
sequence ðjsÞs∈ℕ inB, we show in the online appendix that asD→ 0, theprobability
that the state exits B 0 before x is implemented becomes negligible relative to the
payoff gain of the deviation in the other case. QEDReferences
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